Martin Heidegger

The Phenomenology of Religious Life

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION
   2. AUGUSTINE AND NEO-PLATONISM
   3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MEDIEVAL MYSTICISM

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PART TWO

Phenomenological Explication of Concrete Religious
Phenomena in Connection with the Letters of Paul

Chapter One

Phenomenological Interpretation of the Letters to the Galatians

§14. Introduction

In the following, we do not intend to give a dogmatic or theological-exegetical
interpretation, nor a historical study or a religious meditation, but only guidance
for phenomenological understanding. Characteristic of the phenomenological-religious understanding is gaining an advance understanding for an
original way of access. One must work the religious-historical method into it,
and indeed in such a way that one examines it critically. The theological
method falls out of the framework of our study. Only with phenomenological
understanding, a new way for theology is opened up. The formal indication
renounces the last understanding that can only be given in genuine religious
experience; it intends only to open an access to the New Testament.

Initially, we will interpret the letter of Paul to the Galatians. The letter to
the Galatians was significant for the young Luther; along with the letter to
the Romans, it became a dogmatic fundament. Luther and Paul are, religiously
speaking, the most radical opposites. There is a commentary by Luther on the
letter to the Galatians.1 Yet we must free ourselves from Luther’s standpoint.
Luther sees Paul from out of Augustine. Despite this, there are real connec-
tions of Protestantism with Paul.

The letter to the Galatians contains a historical report from Paul himself
about the story of his conversion. It is the original document for his religious
development and, historically, reports the passionate excitation of Paul him-
self. Correlatively, only the story of the apostles is to be invoked. To begin
with, it suffices to seek a general understanding of the letter to the Galatians
in order to penetrate therewith into the grounding phenomena of primordial
Christian life.

1. In epistolam Pauli ad Galatas commentarius (1519) in D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische
Gesamtausgabe, 2 volumes, Weimar, 1884, pp. 436–618.
The original Greek text is the only one to be used as a basis; an actual understanding presupposes a penetration into the spirit of New Testament Greek. Eberhard Nestle offers the best Greek edition: Novum Testamentum Graecum. If one wants to use the aid of a translation, Luther’s shouldn’t be chosen, for it is all too dependent upon Luther’s own theological standpoint. The translation of Weizsäcker (Verlag v. Mohr, Tübingen) or that of Eberhard Nestle is recommended.

In the letters to the Galatians, Paul is struggling with the Jews and the Jewish Christians. Thus we find the phenomenological situation of religious struggle and of struggle itself. Paul must be seen in struggle with his religious passion in his existence as an apostle, the struggle between “law” and “faith.” This opposition is not a final one; it is rather a preliminary one. Faith and law are both special modes of the path of salvation. The aim is “salvation” (ἡ ὑπηρεσία), finally “life” (ἡ ζωή). The fundamental comportment of Christian consciousness is to be understood out of this, according to the sense of its content, relation, and enactment. Reading modern positions into it is to be avoided. All concepts are to be understood from out of the context of Christian consciousness. In this respect the historical research of theologians has been of service, as questionable as it may be for theology itself.

The letter to the Galatians can be divided in three main parts: 1. Demonstration of the uniqueness of the apostolic mission of Paul and his vocation through Christ; 2. Conflict between law and faith (at first theoretical, and then applied to life); 3. Christian life as a whole, its motives and its tendencies in terms of content.

§ 15. Some Remarks on the Text

1:5: ἱδέω, “world.” The present time has already reached its end and a new world has begun since the death of Christ. The present world is opposed to the world of eternity. ἢ ἡ δόξα [to whom be the glory] has a particular meaning.

1:8–9: The struggle for the “right evangelism.” Intended is not a saving of the Galatians; rather the original Christianity should be grounded from out of itself, without regard for pre-given forms of religion, such as the Jewish- pharisaetical. Paul’s own religious position is to be constituted.

1:10: Significant! Complete break with the earlier past, with every non-Christian view of life.


1:12: Paul wants to say further that he has come to Christianity not through a historical tradition, but through an original experience. A theory that is controversial in Protestant theology connects with this: [it is asserted that] Paul had no historical consciousness of Jesus of Nazareth. Rather he has grounded a new Christian religion, a new primordial Christianity which dominates the future: the Pauline religion, not the religion of Jesus. One thus does not need to refer back to a historical Jesus. The life of Jesus is entirely indifferent. Of course that may not be read out of a single passage.

1:13: Important passage for what is characteristic of Paul. ἀναστορίᾳ [conduct-manner of life]: conducting of life, posture of life to which I am turned.

1:14: ξηλωτής: “zealot.” Paul’s passionateness maintains itself also after his conversion.

1:16: τοῖς ἔθεσιν (among the Gentiles): One does not know whether this became clear to him already with the calling or only gradually.

1:17: Arabia = East Jordan; perhaps ascetic life, perhaps already missionizing.

1:18: ἵσταρον ἵστατον (ἵστατον): to get to know, therefore, “history” [“Historie”]

2:2: Emphasizing the τρέχειν, “running.” Paul is hurried, because the end of time has already come.

2:16: δικαίωμα, “speaking justly,” stems from the Jewish religion. The life of the individual is a trial-process before God, against which Jesus turns ethically in the Sermon on the Mount (“conviction”). The δικαίωμα (νόμος Χριστοῦ) [the law of Christ] later has a new Christian meaning. Paul’s argumentation is here rabbinical-Jewish-theological. His own original position is to be differentiated from this view. The argumentation from out of the Old Testament is characteristically rabbinical.

2:17: This conclusion ab absurdum is found often in Paul.

2:19: Very important! Concentrated form of the entire Pauline dogmatic. ἀπέκτασαν νόμον διὰ νόμου [Through the law I died to the law] merely ethical. Since Christ is identical with the law, the law died with him (as does Paul, too).

2:20: Decisive for Pauline “mysticism.” Reitzenstein points to the connection of the terminology with Hellenism. However, one may not interpret exclusively philologically (hermetic writings).


4:3: ὑπὸ τὸ στοιχεῖον τοῦ κόσμου [to the elemental spirits of the world]: under the elements of the world. In the Stoics στοιχεῖον indicates element, as already in Empedocles. Philo Judas (at the same time as Paul) designates the pagans

as τὰ στοιχεῖα τιμῶντες [elemental spirits]. Compare with 4:9 and 10: stars count as world-elements, the feast-times were arranged according to the stars.

4:8: φύσει μὴ οἰδον θεοὺς [by nature are not gods]. The στοιχεῖα are divine beings. Compare with V. 1: The stages [?] under [?] the guardians are compared to the stage of the star-priests.

4:9: γινώσκειν [to know] in the sense of love (as in the first verse). The love of God to human beings is what is fundamental, not theoretical knowledge.

4:14: “You took no offense to my sickness.” (Sickness often grasped as lecherousness.)

4:24: ἀλληγοροῦμενα [allegory]: the allegorical textual interpretation was then practiced by Philo. Ἀγάρ (“Hagar”) means in Arabic “mountain,” or, that is what the mountain is called in Arabic.

4:26: ἡ ἁγία Ιεροσολυμία [the Jerusalem above]: The final state of redemption is described in the Apocalypse Baruch.

5:5: Connection of πίστις [faith] and ἔλπις [hope] (cf. Cor.) is important. The bliss is not completed here, but is moved to the higher αἰών [world]. Compare to the “unwavering running toward the aim.”

5:11: τὸ σκότος άλων τοῦ σταυροῦ [the offense of the cross]: That is the real fundamental part of Christianity, against which there is only faith or non-faith.

§ 16. The Fundamental Posture of Paul

Paul finds himself in a struggle. He is pressured to assert the Christian life experience against the surrounding world. To this end he uses the insufficient means of rabbinical teaching available to him. From this this explication of Christian life experience has its peculiar structure. Still, it is an original explication from the sense of the religious life itself. It can be further formed out in the primary religious experience. Theoretical contexts remain far from this; an explicational context is won, one that presents itself similarly to a theoretical explication. At issue is a return to the original experience and an understanding of the problem of religious explication.

Harnack’s Dogmengeschichte [History of Dogma] begins only with the third century. According to Harnack, Greek philosophy first dogmatized the Christian religion. But the actual problem of “dogma,” in the sense of religious explication, lies in primordial Christianity. This here lies before us. The question of expression (“explication”) seems to be secondary. Yet, with this seemingly external problem, we stand within the religious phenomenon itself. It is

5. Adolf V. Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3 volumes, Freiburg/Breisgau, 1886–90.
not a technical problem, separate from religious experience; rather the explanation goes along with, and drives, the religious experience.

“Law” is here to be understood primarily as ritual and ceremonial law. Also intended is the merely secondary moral law. Therefore, there is a struggle of the Jewish-Christian community for the law, the law as that which makes the Jew a Jew. ἔργον νόμου [the work of the law]: the attitude to the law. The opposition of faith and law is decisive: the how of faith and of the fulfillment of the law, how I comport myself to the faith and also to the law. Phil. 3:13 shows the fundamental posture of Paul.

The third chapter, in particular, contains a secure dialectical argumentation. Nevertheless, we are not dealing with a logical mode of argumentation. Rather it arises out of the consciousness of faith of this explication itself. The expression λογισμός [to consider, to speak] is characteristic for the articulation of the consciousness of faith, in the sense of making comprehensible the posture of faith for the individual himself, and being able to appropriate the specific-religious-comprehensible meaning. Paul shows his main theological card: the argument that Abraham himself would be justified only through faith. Accordingly, how does it stand at all with the law? 3:2: εἰς ἔργον νόμου [the works of the law]—stands in sharp opposition to εἰς ἀκοής πίστεως [by believing what you hear] (compare with Rom. 10:13, 14). The fulfillment of law is impossible; each fails in it, only faith justifies. Whoever thus stands under the law is condemned. 3:19 offers an accumulation of determinations that are supposed to suggest the inferiority of the law.

In studying the religious world of Paul, one must free oneself from drawing out certain concepts (such as πίστις, δικαιοσύνη, σώμα, etc. [faith, righteousness, flesh]) and putting together their meaning from out of a heap of singular passages of the Pauline writings, so that one has a catalogue of fundamental concepts that say nothing. Equally mistaken is the thought of a theological system in Paul. Rather, the fundamental religious experience must be explained, and, remaining in this fundamental experience, one must seek to understand the connection to it of all original religious phenomena. In order to win a guidance for this kind of study, we will initially emphasize the phenomenon that lies before us in the letter to the Galatians. Later we will reach out historically further, not so much forward into a later time as backward to the original Christian community and to Jesus himself. To be compared with the fundamental posture of Paul is Phil. 3:13: Self-certainty of the situation [Stellung] in his own life—break in his existence—original historical understanding of his self and of his existence. From out of this, he performs his feat as apostle, and as human being.
§ 17. Phenomenological Understanding

In which way are we to consider, for the philosophy of religion, that which we brought to attention, in an entirely primitive way, through a reading of the letter to the Galatians? That is to be decided only out of the leading aim of the task of the philosophy of religion. Therefore, we must sketch out what is most necessary in the method, and indeed in a brief, schematic treatment; thereby the connection with the general methodical introduction will be made as well. If one determines the task of the philosophy of religion entirely naïvely, one can say religion should be understood, grasped philosophically. Religion is to be projected into an understandable context. Thus the position of the problem of the philosophy of religion depends upon the concept of philosophy.

If one admits a limitation to primordial Christian religiosity, one must then observe that it is a historical fact. If one grasps the philosophical context as a determined, demarcated field—for example, as “consciousness”—the primordial Christian religiosity becomes a fact, that is, an example, a singular case in a range of possibilities, of types, of possible forms of religiosity. Because everything historical should come into consideration merely as example, it is clear that—as is entirely usual today, after all—a bare collection of material lies in the sense of this formulation of the problem. Through this formulation of the problem, the object to be recognized—for example primordial Christian religiosity—is already characterized; it is thereby sketched out in a particular sense of history. The historical types of religion are placed into a diversity of possibilities. They are a material to be drawn upon; in this way, they form an extra-temporal diversity.

Which presupposition lays at the bottom of this formulation of the problem? We do not ask this because we reject each and every positing of presuppositions, but because each philosophical positing of the problem must be clear about its presuppositions. Today’s usual philosophy of religion makes the following presuppositions in its positing of the problem, about which it is not clear:

1. Religion is a case or an example of an extra-temporal lawfulness.
2. From religion only that which has the character of consciousness will be taken up.
And indeed the phenomena of consciousness, which correspond to the entirely particular concept of consciousness of the philosophy used as a foundation, standardize the entire formulation of the problem. Now if one describes as our task the phenomenological understanding of primordial Christian religiosity, so it sounds the same according to its wording. However, the former formulation of the problem understands away from its own object; it makes the object disappear. By contrast, it is the tendency of phenomenological understanding to experience the object itself in its originality.

§ 18. Phenomenology of Religion and the History of Religion

One will say that the usual philosophy of religion also holds on to the historical, to the religious-historical. But does the formulation of the problem of the usual history of religion attain to the genuine object of religiosity itself? So long as it is not certain that the religious-historical and the genuine religious-philosophical understanding, that is, phenomenological understanding, coincide, it is still not at all said that the history of religion can deliver material for the philosophy (phenomenology) of religion. To what extent does the religious-historical material, even if only as a starting point for the philosophy of religion, come into question? That is a problem that we cannot decide here; but it is a fundamental problem, which arises for all history of ideas [Geistesgeschichte]. Today’s philosophy of history achieves nothing for positive historical research—and vice versa. It is the “merit” of Spengler to have compressed the comic effect of this situation into a philosophy. The problems of the philosophy of history are to be retrieved only out of the concrete historical sciences themselves.

Is then the material of the history of religion useable for phenomenology? In what way is the history of religion itself at all appropriate to its objects? One could say: If the history of religion clarifies religiosity from out of its religious environment, as [it does] out of its historical time, how can one then accuse it of not reaching its object? After all, it interprets, as objective science, free of prejudices and preconceptions, only on the basis of its material of sense that the contemporary sources offer, independently of all tendencies of the present. This argumentation has certainly an appearance of justification. On the one hand, one has to agree with it to a certain extent. But on the other hand, it must be objected that all objectivity of the science of history and the object-historical understanding offer no guarantee so long as the guiding foreconception is not clarified.

It is to be shown, moreover, that all motives for historical understanding are always awakened through factual life experience. The science of history has only the task of employing them in formal formed-out-ness and in rigorous
methodology. The tendencies of understanding arise from out of the living present, which are then merely formed out in science in "exact" methodology; the "exactness of method" offers in itself no guarantee for correct understanding. The methodical-scientific apparatus—critique of sources according to exact philological methods, etc.—can be fully intact, and still the guiding foreconception can miss the genuine object. Despite this, the modern history of religion accomplishes much for phenomenology, if it is subjected to a phenomenological destruction [Destruktion]. Only then can the history of religion be considered for phenomenology.

In this way, the history of religion accomplishes important preliminary work; at the same time, however, all of its concepts and results necessarily require phenomenological destruction. Yet this is still not a clarification of the context in which the material at hand forms the starting point for understanding. The guiding foreconception of which the historian is himself unaware—that is to say, the tendencies that already motivate the formulation of the problem—is decisive. It is often overlooked, especially in the specialized sciences, that already the formulation of the problem itself in no way offers itself out of the bare material; rather it is already foreconceptually determined. But phenomenology must always keep its eye exactly on this problematic of the foreconception, in connection with history.

§ 19. Basic Determinations of Primordial Christian Religiosity

Now in what sense should the material we have retrieved from the letter to the Galatians be used? What is the aim of our phenomenological understanding? It is not an interpretation on the basis of a historical kind of context, into which the letter to the Galatians would be placed; rather we want to explicate its own meaning. Already the basic determination of primordial Christian religiosity is decisive for this.

First, it is necessary to insert a remark that is important for all religious-historical study. It is therein customary today to work with the categorical opposition of rational and irrational. Today's philosophy of religion is proud of its category of the irrational and, with it, considers the access to religiosity secured. But with these two concepts nothing is said, as long as one does not know the meaning of rational. The concept of the irrational, after all, is supposed to be determined from out of the opposition to the concept of the rational, which, however, finds itself in notorious indetermination. This pair of concepts is thus to be eliminated entirely. Phenomenological understanding,

according to its basic meaning, lies entirely outside of this opposition, which has only a very limited authority, if at all. Everything that is said of the—for reason—indissoluble residue that supposedly remains in all religions, is merely an aesthetic play with things that are not understood.

Which basic determination do we give to the object of the philosophy of religion? The letter to the Galatians had delivered to us a confusing variety of things: Paul’s apostolic calling, warning the community, etc. From that we have carried out an indifferent taking-cognizance, without understanding its guiding foreconception: in order to see that it cannot work this way—that is to say, in order to subject this taking-cognizance to destruction. We encountered a connection that seems to be self-evident: that Paul gives his doctrine and directs his warning wholly in the manner of the Stoic-Cynic wandering preachers of the time. Nothing special lies in the manner of his presentation. One may compare with this the words of the Athenians about him (Acts 17:17 ff.). We, too, approach the letter to the Galatians similarly. The question arises whether this self-evidence is really such, and whether the connection of calling, proclamation, doctrine, warning does not have a motivated sense, one which belongs to the sense of religiosity itself. Thus for example the proclamation is itself a religious phenomenon, which is to be analyzed in all phenomenological directions of sense.

Now in the presentation our basic determinations run like propositions; but they are not to be understood as propositions that are to be proven afterwards. Whoever takes them as such misunderstands them. They are phenomenological explications. As basic determinations we state two for now:

1. Primordial Christian religiosity is in primordial Christian life experience and is itself such.
2. Factual life experience is historical. Christian religiosity lives temporality as such.\(^3\)

These fundamental determinations are for now hypothetical. We ask: If, with these, the basic meaning of Christian religiosity is hit upon, what follows from that methodologically?

\(\S\ 20.\ \text{The Phenomenon of Proclamation}\)

Now, from out of the indicated context, we single out the phenomenon of proclamation, because in it the immediate life-relation of the world of self of Paul to the surrounding world and to the communal world of the community

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2. [Presumably, Becker, from whose notes this sentence is taken, misheard here, and instead of “live” ([lebt] wrote “*teach” ([lehr]).
3. [Marginal comment in F. J. Brecht’s notations: transitive]
is able to be comprehended. It is thus a central phenomenon. Now in a purely formal manner, various questions can be posed: Who proclaims? How is proclamation done? What is proclaimed? etc. Here, too, there exists a certain complex out of which a unity is to be retrieved. And indeed we emphasize the How of proclamation. The enactment of life is decisive. The complex of enactment is co-experienced in life. Out of this it is to be made understandable that the How of the enactment has basic meaning. We are thus asking after the How of the proclamation of Paul. We are relatively conveniently situated for answering this question, for after all we have the How of proclamation before us in Paul’s letters. Within the formulation of the question of the How of proclamation, the epistolary character appears, all of a sudden, as a phenomenon.

Theology—especially Protestant theology— influenced by the development of the historical humanities in the nineteenth century, has brought forth work on the history of style in regard to the literary forms of the New Testament. Further investigations may be eagerly expected, although the point of departure is misguided as much according to the science of history as phenomenologically. One approaches the matter entirely externally, insofar as one integrates the New Testament writing into world literature, in order to analyze its forms accordingly. Even if it were so that the forms of the New Testament are differentiated in no way from contemporary literature, still one may not proceed in this way. In analyzing the character of the letter, one must take as the only point of departure the Pauline situation and the How of the necessary motivation of the communication in letters. The content proclaimed, and its material and conceptual character, is then to be analyzed from out of the basic phenomenon of proclamation.

§ 21. Foreconceptions of the Study

The foreconceptions in the historical study extend in their effects into the critique of sources, the singularities of the assessment of the text, conjectures, questions of authenticity. One can illustrate this in the first letter to the Thessalonians, which was declared inauthentic by the Tübingen school which stands under Hegelian influence, on the basis of its slight dogmatic content in comparison to other Pauline letters. Thus, the foreconception reaches all the way into the most minuscule aspects of historical research, indeed into the edition of sources. In this, the relations in art history are again different from those in the history of religion.

Thus, each pre-given historical material must be submitted to a forecon-

ceptual observation. But with that nothing is yet achieved for phenomenological understanding, because it has a different character than the object-historical. Object-historical understanding is determination according to the aspect of the relation, from out of the relation, so that the observer does not come into question. By contrast, phenomenological understanding is determined by the enactment of the observer. Despite the different origins of understanding, the connection of phenomenological understanding to the history of objects is closer than in other sciences.

Thus phenomenological understanding consists, first, not in the projecting of what is to be understood, which, after all, is no kind of object, in a material complex. It has, secondly, never the tendency of determining such a realm with finality, but rather is subordinated to the historical situation—insofar as the foreconception is even more decisive for phenomenological understanding than object-historical understanding. Thus, one has to begin at the starting point (the foreconception) of the phenomenological understanding. Such a starting point is not possible for every observer, for every phenomenon; it must be borne by a familiarity with the phenomenon. One proceeds methodologically securely if one approaches the basic determination purely formally; one intentionally affords the concepts a certain lability in order to secure their determination first in the process of phenomenological study itself. In this sense we have posited the following starting points for the sake of the determination of primordial Christian religiosity:

1. Primordial Christian religiosity is in factual life experience. Postscript: It is such experience itself.

2. Factual life experience is historical. Postscript: Christian experience lives time itself ("to live" understood as verbum transitivum).

One cannot prove these "theses." Rather they must prove themselves in phenomenological experience itself. The letter is something other than empirical experience. The basic determinations are thus hypothetical: "If they are valid, then such and such results for the phenomenon."

We initially consider the apostolic proclamation of Paul. If it represents a basic phenomenon, from out of it must be won a relation to the total religious basic phenomenon. In the enactment and through the enactment, the phenomenon is explicated. "Apostolic proclamation" is still too broad a characterization of the phenomenon. The apostolic proclamation is decisively clarified as soon as it is determined in its How, in its sense of enactment. This formulation of the question of the How is thus decisive. The character of the material—that we are dealing with letters—is convenient for these questions. The Pauline letters are, as sources, more immediate than the later-composed gospels. However, one may not isolate the epistolary character, nor bring into the problem the literary question of style. They are not primary. The epistolary style itself is the expression of the writer and his situation. Although the
Pauline letters lie so near to each other temporally, so that a Pauline development from one to another does not come into question, they are nevertheless really different. For example, the letters to the Romans and to the Galatians are much richer in dogmatic content than the letter to the Thessalonians. One must free oneself as well from the schematic classification of the letters.

§ 22. The Schema of Phenomenological Explication

How is a phenomenological explication of its material enacted? “Material” has a particular methodological sense. The explication of the phenomenon from out of the material is carried out in particular stages. Schematically speaking, the steps of the phenomenological explication are as follows:

1. Because the basic phenomenon is factual life experience, and because it is historical, so the first task is to determine the complex of phenomena object-historically, pre-phenomenologically, as a historical situation, but already from out of phenomenological motives.

2. The enactment of the historical situation of the phenomenon is to be gained. To this end: (a) the diversity of what may be encountered in the situation is to be characterized—and indeed in such a manner that nothing is to be decided about its actual connections (briefly: articulation of the situational diversity); (b) the “accentuating situation” of the diversity is to be gained; (c) the primary or “arch-ontic (reigning) sense” of the accentuating situation is to be ascertained; (d) from there to arrive at the phenomenal complex; and (e) from out of this to posit the study of origin.

But in doing this, we must remain conscious of certain limitations:

1. The basic comportment of the personal life experience of the observer (phenomenologist) is eliminated.

2. The study aims at the historical phenomena, but does not yet involve that which is decisive. One should note that the explication comes to a head ever more from step to step, becomes more and more individual, grows ever nearer to the peculiar historical facticity. This succession of steps becomes understandable only if one frees oneself from the theory of regions—unshakably.

Remarks on the schema of phenomenological explication:

Re: 1. Gaining the object-historical complex is already determined by the aim of the explication. It is not coincidental. The object-historical emphases should be studied; they yield an authentic emphasis and should be kept in mind. Re: 2. The application of the object-historical complex of occurrence to the original-historical situation encounters three difficulties.
A) Presentation through Language:

The language of the study of the material is not original. There is a more original conceptuality already in factual life experience, from out of which the material conceptuality that is common to us first derives. This reversal in conceptuality must be enacted, or else it is hopeless to ever grasp the situation. One may not simply take up self-evident concepts. (The question of the philosophical concepts has not been posed since Socrates.) At times, one believes to come closer to the problem through a “dialectic.” But one may not posit life as “irrational” without being clear about the sense of irrationality. No material of explication has been understood as long as its indicated sense complex is not enacted. The complex of enactment itself belongs to the concept of the phenomenon. The philosophical concept has a structure incomparable to the material concept.

B) “Empathizing” with a Situation:

The problem of empathy does not budge as long as one grasps it epistemologically. But the motive of the problem of empathy is not epistemological at all. Empathy arises in factual life experience, that is to say, it involves an original-historical phenomenon that cannot be resolved without the phenomenon of tradition in its original sense. Today the environment of Paul is entirely foreign to us. But what is crucial for us is not the material character, the ideational of his surrounding world. This moment falls away entirely; the environment first gains its sense out of the understanding of the situation.

C) The Question of the Explication Itself:

Through the completion of the explication, that which is explicated becomes apparently independent, released from its enactment. But this is a distorted view. It is peculiar to the theoretical, attitudinal abstraction that what is abstracted is grasped as a moment of a material region, so that thereby the basic determinations of the region are won. What is abstracted is studied further without reference to that from which it is abstracted; the fundamentum of the abstraction does not matter. The abstraction as such, the transition from the fundamentum abstractionis to the abstracting is not co-experienced. Otherwise in the explication: if particular moments are explicated in the explication, those moments of sense to which the explication is not directed are not simply shoved aside; rather the How of their reaching into the just explicated, directional sense—or the direction of sense in the process of explication—is co-determined precisely by the explication itself. Here one could ask: Can one,
with the relational sense (for example), study as well the “What” (the content) of that to which one is comported, and even the How of the enactment? But this objection is attitudinal. The directions of sense are all three grasped. The enactment of the explication is not a separated succession of acts, grasping determinations. It is to be gained only in a concrete life-context. One can thereby also, at the same time, have the directions of sense that are “not seen.”
Chapter Three

Phenomenological Explication of the First Letter to the Thessalonians

§ 23. Methodological Difficulties

The first letter to the Thessalonians was written in the year 53 A.D. (thus twenty years after the crucifixion); it is the earliest document of the New Testament. Its authenticity is now no longer doubted. We ask, according to the stated method: What is the object-historical situation of Paul as he wrote the letter? The letter was written on the first missionary trip in Corinth. The trip led first to Philippi, from there for three weeks to Thessalonica. The opposition of the Jews led Paul to leave the city secretly, and from there [he went] to Athens, from which he sent Timothy back to Salonika and met him again only in Corinth. Paul writes the letter just after his arrival in Corinth. The situation is entirely determined by this. Compare for this I Thess. 3:6; 3:2; Acts 18:5. On the first sojourn of Paul in Thessalonica see Acts 17:1–16. If we present this object-historically, Paul appears as a missionary who talks as a usual wandering preacher, without attracting too much attention.

Now we no longer observe the object-historical complex, but rather see the situation such that we write the letter along with Paul. We perform the letter-writing, or its dictation, with him. The first question: How does Paul, in the situation of a letter-writer, stand to the Thessalonians? How are they experienced by him? How is his communal world given to him in the situation of writing the letter? That is connected to the question, how Paul stands to this communal world. The content of the communal world is to be seen in its determination in connection with the How of the relation to this communal world. Thus we must draw out the basic determination of this relation.

We have still another methodological difficulty to consider. One could say it is impossible—or possible only in a limited way—to transport oneself into Paul’s exact situation. Indeed, we do not know his environment at all. This objection arises from the view that what is given in the manner of objects is primary for a situation with which one must “empathize.” But one must judge Paul’s position with regard to his surroundings from out of his personality and ask whether the surroundings are important for him at all. The “empathy” problem is posed, for the most part, epistemologically, and is therefore misguided in its starting point. Scheler’s view comes closest to the right one—which, however, is still strongly epistemologically burdened. Furthermore, the
assertions of Paul are not different from an objective-historical report. That is a problem of presentation: through language, each expression falls into an attitudinal one. One must realize that it is misguided to cut concepts of objects to fit subjectivity.

Finally the problem of emphasis. How are the givenness of the surrounding world, the communal world, and the self-world, which flow into each other in factual life, emphasized? One can always observe only one at a time. This emphasis is not abstraction, because the other factors are nevertheless constantly co-given. The tendency is not toward the dissipation of historical facticity, toward gaining general religious-phenomenological assertions from one example. It is not the ideal of a theoretical construction that is aimed for, but the originality of the absolute-historical in its absolute unrepeatability. All questions of philosophy are, at bottom, questions about the How—strictly understood, questions of method.

The turn at which the object-historical situation becomes an enactment-historical one succumbs to a difficulty in presentation in the explication of the enactment-historical situation; and there exists an immanent explication with a more original conceptuality than that with which we are familiar, from which the usual conceptuality is first always derived, from which it originates.

The actual preliminary question about the meaning of philosophical conceptuality has not been posed since Socrates. The conceptuality familiar to us tends toward the attitudinal, the study of matter. If one, from here, views only the problem of presentation, one sees that each thing to be explicated which is made known in talk, is not understood as long as one does not also grasp the complex of enactment in the concept. The material concept is absolutely incomparable to the phenomenological concept. An original consideration of the motives of the problem of empathy shows that it has nothing to do with epistemological questions. The problem of “empathy” is not to be solved without the phenomenon of tradition (of historical-factual life experience).

One difficulty is that we cannot at all, with our ideas, put ourselves in Paul’s place. [Such an attempt] is misguided because what is crucial is not the material character of Paul’s environment, but rather only his own situation. The problem of the presentation, empathy, and explication of “autonomized individuals” is badly posed. The explication differs from each material abstraction of the theoretical attitude. There abstraction is grasped as affiliated with and co-determining a material region: it is essential that the abstracted is fixed in further progress without regard to that from which it is abstracted, so that the “from which” remains a matter of indifference for the sense of the abstracted. Accordingly, the transition from the base to the abstracted is not important. Explication means: if it is explicated toward a particular direction of sense, the remaining directions of meaning are co-projected into it. In this, it is important to determine the How of the co-projection. If one claims it is
not possible to explicate one direction and in the same stroke the others as well—as, for example, the content-sense, relational-sense, and enactment: attitudinal comportment of this objection. The individual directions of sense are not things. The complete disappearance of this difficulty can be seen only in a concrete situational context.

The turn from the object-historical complex to the enactment-historical situation itself derives from connections which can be shown in factual life experience. Does one, with this turning-around, at all emerge from history? Where does the phenomenological begin? This objection is legitimate, but it maintains as its background the conviction that the philosophical has a special dimension. That is the misunderstanding. Philosophy is return to the original-historical. This difficulty, therefore, does not burden our study.

§ 24. The “Situation”

The turning-around from the object-historical to the enactment-historical lies in factual life experience itself. It is a turning-around to the situation. “Situation” counts here for us as a phenomenological term. It would not be used for objective contexts (also not historically such as “condition”—for example, fatal situation or condition). “Situation” is thus for us something that belongs to understanding in the manner of enactment, it does not designate anything in the manner of an order. A diversity of situations or also within a situation should not be grasped as a complex of order. A situational series is not, moreover, a series in the manner of an order (compare to Bergson’s “durée concrète”). The question of the demarcation of a situation is independent of the determination of an object-theoretical section, of a historical period or epoch. And the object-historical period is also something other than a mathematically-physically determined particular period. A special investigation is needed in order to determine when an object-historical—and a situational—demarcation coincide. For the question of the unity or the diversity of the situation, it is important that we can gain them only in the formal indication. The unity is not formally logical, but merely formally indicated. The formal indication is in the “neither-nor”; it is neither something in the manner of an order, nor explication of a phenomenological determination.

We cannot project a situation into a particular field of being, nor into “consciousness.” We cannot speak of a “situation of a point A between B and C.” Language protests against this. And indeed we cannot do this because a point is nothing “like an I” [Ichliches]. “Being like an I” is understood entirely

indeterminately. "Being like an I" belongs to each situation. With that it is not said that the "like an I" of a situation is that which unifies the diversity. Nothing is expressed about the relation of the I and the not-I. One should not here read into this a subject-object relationship, nor claim in the wake of Fichte that "The I posits the not-I." About that, we express nothing. Apparently the Fichtean relation is entirely general, but it nevertheless prejudices already entirely particular connections; it says: "The I posits the form of non-I-ness"—not the factual world is posited. Fichte only grasped the Kantian situation more sharply. That which is "like an I" can stand in connection with the same and with the not-I, and the latter amongst itself.

The only differentiation we make between that which is "like an I" and the not-I is the following: "That which is "like an I" is and has the not-I, the not-I merely is and does not have." This again as entirely formal indication; the is should not even be taken in the seemingly most general way, as predication, much less as existence, real occurrence, etc. The problem is the origin of the concepts of Being; the predicative is of theoretical explication arises out of the original "I am," not the other way around. Insofar as that which is "like an I" has something, the departure for the situation can be taken from here. For what is had seems to give itself objectively. It offers a starting point for the carrying-out of the explication.

"Situation" carries in itself, in the usual sense of the word, a sense of the static. This connotation must be disregarded. And yet a "dynamical" view misjudges the situation as well, in which one views the phenomenal context as a "flowing" and speaks of the flow of the phenomena. From that viewpoint, "situation" means a "shutting-down." But the situational complex stands beyond the alternatives of "static-dynamic." For the notion of flowing and streaming has the manner of an order as well; therefore homogeneity is at least implied, if not explicitly co-posted. The time of factual life is to be gained from the complex of enactment of factual life itself, and from there the static or dynamic character of the situation is to be determined.

We grasp situation purely formally as unity of a diversity. What makes up its unity remains indeterminate—but the situation is not a homogeneous field of relations; the situational structure does not run in one or more dimensions, but rather entirely otherwise. Already the starting point of a phenomenological study as having the manner of an order and the attempt of a material description fails because of the phenomenon itself. One must return ever again to the point of departure. The departure is to be taken from the having-relation of that which is "like an I." For what is had seems always still to appear as

something objectively characterizable: the relation of the people before Paul to him is how he has them.

§ 25. The “Having-Become” of the Thessalonians

Thus we will pursue as what Paul has the congregation in Thessalonica and how he has it. In doing so, we will go back to a particular moment of the object-historical report: Acts 17:4—to Paul’s relation to the “few” who “fell to him” (καὶ τινὲς ἔστιν ἐπισκόπησαν καὶ προσεκληρύναν τῷ Παῦλῳ [some of them were persuaded and joined Paul]). In turning to the “situation,” is this object-historical relation retained, and in which way does it come to expression in the letter-writing? Paul is co-included in the state of the congregation (of the τινὲς [some]). The Thessalonians are those who fell to him. In them, he necessarily co-experiences himself.

We put forth formally the state of the relation of Paul to those who have “given themselves over to him.” Paul experiences the Thessalonians in two determinations: 1. He experiences their having-become (γενέσθαι). 2. He experiences, that they have a knowledge of their having-become (οἴδατε [you know]). That means their having-become is also Paul’s having-become. And Paul co-affected by their having-become. Showing this concretely from the letter is very easy. In the course of I Thess., the frequent use of (1) γενέσθαι [to come, to become] and similar words, and (2) οἴδατε [you know], μνημονεύσατε [you remember], among others, is striking. The thorough pursuit of the repetition of the same word seems external; but one must view this, in an enactment-historical understanding, as an ever-repeatedly surfacing tendency, as a motif. That is something other than the repetition of a natural event.

Re: 1. I Thess. 1:5, 6, 7, etc. The complex of the event is emphasized here in a particular way. The ἐγένηθαι [became] enters it again and again. In writing, Paul sees them as those whose life he has entered. Their having-become is linked to his entrance into their life (ἐλθον, 2:1 [coming]). 2:5 ἐγένησαν [came]: the “how” of this entrance is characterized (compare with 2:7, 8, 10, 14). These passages emphasize that for Paul the Thessalonians are there because he and they are linked to each other in their having-become.

Re: 2. “οἴδατε” [as you know]: 2:2, 5 in connection with γενέσθαι [came]. 2:9 μνημονεύσατε [you remember]. 2:11 οἴδατε [as you know]. 3:6 ἔχετε μνείαν [you remember]. 4:2 οἴδατε [you know]. 4:9 οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν [you do not need to have anyone write to you]. 5:1 οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν γράφειν ὑμῖν [you do not need to have anything written to you]. This knowledge is entirely different from any other knowledge and memory. It arises only out of the situational context of Christian life experience.
Knowledge about one's own having-become poses a very special task for the explication. From out of this the meaning of a facticity is determined, one which is accompanied by a particular knowledge. We tear the facticity apart from the knowledge, but the facticity is entirely originally co-experienced. Especially in this problem, the failure of the "scientific psychology of experience" can be shown. Having-become is not, in life, [just] any incident you like. Rather, it is incessantly co-experienced, and indeed such that their Being [Sein] now is their having-become [Gewordensein]. Their having-become is their Being now. We can grasp that more closely first through a narrower determination of having-become. Can one explicate this meaning from out of the letter itself?

I Thess. 6: The γενέσθαι is a δέχοσθαι τὸν λόγον, an "acceptance of the proclamation"—ἐν ὀλίγῃ πολλῇ μετὰ χαρᾶς—"in great despair." The δέχοσθαι brought the despair with it, which also continues, yet at the same time a "joy" (μετὰ χαρᾶς) which comes from the Holy Spirit (τὸ μνήμα τοῦ θεοῦ) is alive—a joy which is a gift, thus not motivated from out of one's own experience. This all belongs to the character of the γενέσθαι. 2:13: λόγον θεοῦ [the word of God] is at the same time a subjective and objective genitive. The having-become is understood such that with the acceptance, the one who accepts treads upon an effective connection with God. 4:1: παραλαβέω [learned], you have accepted the how of the Christian standard of living, etc. That which is accepted concerns the how of self-conduct in factual life.

Thus we have determined γενέσθαι through δέχοσθαι [to accept], further through παραλαβέων [receiving]. That which is accepted is the how of self-conduct. The main passage which clarifies the connection is 1:9-10. It is about an absolute turning-around, more precisely about a turning-toward God and a turning-away from idol-images. The absolute turning-toward within the sense of enactment of factual life is explicated in two directions: δουλεύων [serving] and ἀναμένων [waiting], a transformation before God and an obstinate waiting.

Knowledge of one's own having-become is the starting point and the origin of theology. In the explication of this knowledge and its conceptual form of expression the sense of a theological conceptual formation arises. The δέχοσθαι is characterized in its how ἐν θλίψει (in despair). The acceptance consists in entering oneself into the anguish of life. A joy is bound up therewith, one which comes from the Holy Spirit and is incomprehensible to life. παραλαβέων does not mean a belonging; rather it means an acceptance with the winning of a living effective connection with God. The being-present of God has a basic relationship to the transformation of life (περιπατεῖν [living]). The acceptance is in itself a transformation before God.

Now we give a formal schematic of the phenomenon. Without pre-understanding the entire context one cannot extract a singular reference. The
formal schematic of the explication has meaning only in the formal articulation. [for] it does not emerge in the enactment of phenomenological understanding. In its formal elevation what is authentic is lacking.

On 1:9–10: The turning-toward God is primary. The turning-away from the έιδολα [idol] first arises from out of it and with it. This turning-away is secondary. ἐπιστρέφειν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων [you turned to God from idols] (εἰδώλον in classical Greek means “illusion,” in the Septuaginta “idol images,” where Paul has it from). For the explication, the task arises to determine the sense of the objecthood of God. It is a decrease of authentic understanding if God is grasped primarily as an object of speculation. That can be realized only if one carries out the explication of the conceptual connections. This, however, has never been attempted, because Greek philosophy penetrated into Christianity. Only Luther made an advance in this direction, and from this his hatred of Aristotle can be explained.

2:20: ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἔστε ἡ χαρά. “You are my joy and my δόξα.” οὔτε ζητοῦντες ἐξ ἀνθρώπων δόξαν οὔτε ἄφ ύμων [nor did we seek praise from mortals whether from you or from others] (2:6) seems to stand in absolute contradiction to 2:20. Paul wants to win his own security through his success with the Thessalonians. Here is meant the opposition to the Greek wandering preachers, whom Lucian accuses of δοξολογία (addiction to fame). 3:8: Paul’s life is dependent upon the Thessalonians’ standing firm in their belief. He hands himself over entirely to the fate of the Thessalonians. The concepts ἐλπίς, δόξα, χαρά [hope, glory, joy] have a special meaning, or else one arrives at contradictions. In order to gain the sense of these concepts, we are forced to go to the basic context of the life of Paul himself. The entire conceptual structure is otherwise than one at first thinks. We are compelled, by the force of the phenomena themselves, to go back to what is original.

δουλεύειν and δοκείμενον determine every other reference as fundamental directions. The awaiting of the παροιμία of the Lord is decisive. The Thessalonians are hope for him not in a human sense, but rather in the sense of the experience of the παροιμία. The experience is an absolute distress (θλίμας) which belongs to the life of the Christian himself. The acceptance (δέχομαι) is an entering-onself-into anguish. This distress is a fundamental characteristic, it is an absolute concern in the horizon of the παροιμία, of the second coming at the end of time. With that we are introduced into the self-world of Paul.

§ 26. The Expectation of the Parousia

Paul lives in a peculiar distress, one that is, as apostle, his own, in expectation of the second coming of the Lord. This distress articulates the authentic sit-
uation of Paul. It determines each moment of his life. He is constantly beset by a suffering, despite his joy as apostle. Twice in the text we find: μὴ κατ’ οὐκ ὑπὸ νοτον τοις “we cannot take it anymore” (3:1; 3:5); 3:10: the having-become of the Thessalonians is at the same time a new becoming. τὰ ὑποτελεῖς [is lacking] means: a supplement is needed.

2:17: For Paul, the Thessalonians have an absolute significance. One must proceed from his distress, in order to understand his letter-writing comportment. We take a further look into the self-world of Paul, in that we approach the passage II Cor. 12:2–10. Having been blessed with inspiration is not what is decisive; he excludes that and does not communicate it. The how of the enrapturment is unknown and unimportant. II Cor. 12:5: separation of existence as one who is enraptured and as apostle. Paul wants to be seen only in his weakness and distress. There is certainly a still more original reason why the difficulty belongs to the Christian. ὑγόλογ θερτί [a thorn in the flesh]—what that is is much discussed. It is to be understood more generally than Augustine does, who grasps it as concupiscencia. ὑγόλογ, “flesh” is the original sphere of all affects not motivated from God.

2:18: ὑγόλογ ἢμασιος ὑγόλογ ὑστεροκεῖας, “Satan hindered us.” One may not stay with the idea that Paul is speaking of “Satan.” The concept of Satan and his place in the life of the Christian cannot be explicated on the basis of this passage alone. In the Old Testament, “Satan” means simply “adversary,” “enemy in war,” to get to the point, “the one who fights against what God wants.” What is primary is not speculating whether and what the devil is. Rather one must understand how the devil stands in and affects Paul’s life. Satan constantly hinders the work of Paul in exacerbating his distress, this absolute apostolic concern about his calling in this end of time. Cf. 3:5 ὑγόλογ ὑστεροκεῖας, the “teemper.”

3:11: Paul then asks God in prayer (prayer in the decisive sense) to direct him to the path to the Thessalonians. Already in 2:17 he calls himself bereft, because, after all, he is far from them. The conclusion of the letter at 5:27 corresponds to the prayer: “I implore you to read the letter aloud to all.” These moments—the impossibility of bearing it any longer, the devil, the call to prayer, the imploring at the end—all this makes possible, for the good will, an understanding of Paul’s distress. In other letters cf. II Cor. 5:7.

The passages I Thess. 4:13–18 and 5:1–12 are to be compared in order to clarify the idea of the παρουσία. If the situation is now indicated, we come now to the letter-writing as a form of proclamation. The following interpretation should take care of several difficulties heretofore. The questions are these: 1. How does it stand with the dead, who no longer experience the παρουσία (4:14–18)? 2. When will the παρουσία take place (5:1–12)?

First we take up the second question. We can first gather how Paul understands the question from out of the how of the answer. Paul does not answer the question in worldly reasoning. He maintains a total distance from a cog-
native treatment, but does not also, in that, claim that it is unknowable. Paul
enacts the answer in juxtaposing two ways of life: ἀπεκτείνω [when they
say] . . . verse 3, and ὡς εἰς δὲ [but you] . . . verse 4. What is decisive is how I
comport myself to it in actual life. From that results the meaning of the
“when?,” time and the moment. The difficulties of phenomenological under-
standing are not only technical ones. The meaning of the individual as that
of the infinitely complicated does not come into question here. The under-
standing is made difficult in its enactment itself; this difficulty grows con-
stantly the nearer it approaches the concrete phenomenon. It is the difficulty
of putting-oneself-into-another’s-place, which cannot be supplanted by a
fantasizing-oneself-into or a “vicarious understanding”; what is required is an
authentic enactment.

II Cor. 12:2–10 gave us a preview of the self-world of Paul. The extraor-
dinary in his life plays no role for him. Only when he is weak, when he
withstands the anguish of his life, can he enter into a close connection with
God. This fundamental requirement of having-God is the opposite of all bad
mysticism. Not mystical absorption and special exertion; rather withstanding
the weakness of life is decisive. Life for Paul is not a mere flow of events; it
is only insofar as he has it. His life hangs between God and his vocation. The
ways of “having” life itself, which belongs with the enactment of life, still
increases the anguish (θλίψεις). Each authentic complex of enactment increases
it. What has been won heretofore is to be understood methodologically, in
that from out of this it first becomes understandable what Paul has to say to
the Thessalonians. What he says to them, and how he says it to them, is
determined by his own situation. Schematically:

What of the proclaimed determines through it that Paul now communicates something
to the Thessalonians

How

It is this, the pressing situation, in which he writes the letter: cf. I Thess.
3:10: ἀπεκτείνω [most earnestly] is a very strong expression for “urgent”;
τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τῆς πίστεως [what is lacking in your faith]: important for the
place of sins in Christian life. The proclamation is for Paul characterized
formally by an intervention in the knowledge of the Thessalonians at a par-
ticular moment. Through the phenomenological characteristic of the procla-
mation the following must become apparent as authentic perspectives:

(1) A decisive understanding of the communal-worldly relation of Paul to
the Thessalonians; (2) what Paul’s situation authentically accentuates; (3) from
this the solution of the problem of knowledge, which belongs with facticity;
(4) a preview of the richer structure of Christian life experience, which is, in its "What" and "How," always dependent upon the complex of enactment. Cf. with this from the summer semester 1919 lecture (""Über das Wesen der Universität" ["On the Essence of the University"]) the argument about the origin of perception and of knowledge from the explication of factual life experience—and from the lecture in winter 1919–1920 ("Phänomenologische Grundprobleme" ["Basic Problems of Phenomenology"]) the developments regarding the concrete logic of a material region.4

The difference of our present study from that of the letter to the Galatians is important. It was only a mere taking-cognizance of the content, but it is a particular necessary step within the connection of access to understanding itself; this step will always be taken, if we attempt to carry out the authentic enactmenital-historical understanding. The letter to the Galatians has a "dogmatic" content. This content is seen primarily in the exegesis. One must, however, be clear about how this content is to be understood as "believing knowledge." What Paul says is characterized by the fact that he says it now to the Thessalonians or the Galatians. One may not pounce upon the isolated content. The so-called dogmatic content of the letters is to be understood according to the entirety of how a communication of Christian knowledge is maintained. One err if one grasps it in isolation.

What is the dogmatic form of the first letter to the Thessalonians? Paul answers two questions posed to him (see above page [German p. 99]):

Initially, the expression παρουσία has in its conceptual history a sense we do not intend here; the expression changes its entire conceptual structure, not only its sense, in the progress of its history. Christian life experience different in kind is evident in this conceptual transformation. In classical Greek παρουσία means arrival (presence); in the Old Testament (for instance in the Septuaginta) "the arrival of the Lord on the Day of Judgement"; in late Judaism "the arrival of the Messiah as representative of God." For the Christian, however, παρουσία means "the appearing again of the already appeared Messiah," which, to begin with, does not lie in the literal expression. With that, however, the entire structure of the concept is at once changed.

One could think, first of all: the basic comportment to the παρουσία is a waiting, and Christian hope (ἐλπίς) is a special case thereof. But that is entirely false! We never get to the relational sense of the παρουσία by merely analyzing the consciousness of a future event. The structure of Christian hope, which in truth is the relational sense of Parousia, is radically different from all ex-

pectation. “Time and moment” (5:1: “περὶ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν,” always used in one) offers a special problem for the explication. The “When” is already not originally grasped, insofar as it is grasped in the sense of an attitudinal “objective” time. The time of “factual life” in its falling, unemphasized, non-Christian sense is also not meant. Paul does not say “When,” because this expression is inadequate to what is to be expressed, because it does not suffice.

The entire question for Paul is not a cognitive question (cf. 5:2: αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀκριβῶς οἶδατε [For you yourselves know very well]). He does not say, “at this or that time the Lord will come again”; he also does not say, “I do not know when he will come again”—rather he says: “You know exactly….” This knowledge must be of one’s own, for Paul refers the Thessalonians back to themselves and to the knowledge that they have as those who have become. This sort of answer determines that the question is decided in dependence upon their own life. Thus he juxtaposes two different ways of life (5:3: ὅταν λέγοντες [when they say]… and 5:4: ὑμεῖς δὲ… [But you]). But this is not a juxtaposition of two different types; rather the motive lies in the How of the communication.

We will find this sort of juxtaposition again in the second letter to the Thessalonians. One observes: ὅταν λέγοντες (5:3), “if you say,” that is, they are such who realize at all to say something about that. εἰρήνη καὶ ὁμολογία (5:3), “peace and security” in factual life: this expression represents the How of self-compartment to that which encounters me in factual life. That which encounters me in my worldly comportment carries no reason for disturbance. Those who find rest and security in this world are those who cling to this world because it provides peace and security. “Peace and security” characterizes the mode of this relation to those who speak this way.

Sudden ruin overcomes them (5:3 τότε ἀφινόμεθα καὶ ἀφίσταται ὅλοθρος [then sudden destruction will come upon them]). They are surprised by it, do not expect it. Or still better: they are precisely in the attitudinal expectation; their expectation is absorbed by what life brings to them. Because they live in this expectation, the ruin hits them in such a way that they cannot flee from it. They cannot save themselves, because they do not have themselves, because they have forgotten their own self, because they do not have themselves in the clarity of authentic knowledge. Thus they cannot grab hold of and save themselves (cf. 5:4 ἐν σκότω: “in the dark”). The comparison with the pregnant woman (5:3) characterizes the suddenness. It offers particular problems, namely what the comparison achieves in the sense complex, how far it can be “pressed,” etc. In general, the use of the comparisons presents the explication with particular tasks.

5:4: ὑμεῖς δὲ, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἐστέ ἐν σκότω: “but you, brothers, are not in the darkness.”—Ἰνα ἢ ἡμέρα ὑμᾶς ὡς κλέπτης καταλάβῃ, “so that the day surprises
you like a thief.”—\( \text{κημέρα} \) has a double meaning: (1) opposite the darkness is the “brightness” of knowledge of oneself (τoιος ὑποί νοτιός ἔστης 5:5 [for you are all children of light]). (2) \( \text{κημέρα} \) means “day of the Lord,” that is, “day of the \( \text{παρουσίας} \).” This then is the kind and mode of Paul’s answer. Through this (“let us keep awake”) we see: the question of the “When” leads back to my comportment. How the \( \text{παρουσίας} \) stands in my life, that refers back to the enactment of life itself. The meaning of the “When,” of the time in which the Christian lives, has an entirely special character. Earlier we formally characterized: “Christian religiosity lives temporality.” It is a time without its own order and demarcations. One cannot encounter this temporality in some sort of objective concept of time. The when is in no way objectively graspsable.

The meaning of this temporality is also fundamental for factual life experience, as well as for problems such as that of the eternity of God. In the medieval period these problems were no longer grasped originally, following the penetration of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy into Christianity, and today’s speculation which speaks of God increases the chaos. The pinnacle of the error is reached today in projecting onto God the concept of validity.

The present study takes up the center of Christianity: the eschatological problem. Already at the end of the first century the eschatological was covered up in Christianity. In later times one misjudged all original Christian concepts. In today’s philosophy, too, the Christian concept-formations are hidden behind a Greek view. One would also have to draw on the gospels—the great eschatological sermon of Jesus in the gospel Matthew and Mark—out of which the basic position of the problem arises. The basic direction of eschatology is already late Judaic, the Christian consciousness [being] a peculiar transformation thereof. The origin of the meaning of the respective concepts is characteristic (cf. the apocalypse of Ezra\(^5\)). The division of the directions of sense (form, relation, enactment) must be observed. The How of grasping reality, the How of understanding events is not to be carried out objective-attitudinally from out of the “reasonable human understanding.” Rather, understanding the entire situation is necessary for understanding the phenomena. Here, how Paul answers the question of the “When” of the \( \text{παρουσίας} \) is decisive; from this can one first judge what he said.

There is no security for Christian life; the constant insecurity is also characteristic for what is fundamentally significant in factual life. The uncertainty is not coincidental; rather it is necessary. This necessity is not a logical one, nor is it of natural necessity. In order to see this clearly, one must reflect on one’s own life and its enactment. Those “who speak of peace and security” (5:3) spend themselves on what life brings them, occupy themselves with

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5. [The so-called fourth Book of Ezra, from the end of the first century a.d., contains a Jewish apocalypse.]
whatever tasks of life. They are caught up in what life offers; they are in the
dark, with respect to knowledge of themselves. The believers, on the contrary,
are sons of the light and of the day.

Paul's answer to the question of the When of the παρονοια is thus an urging
to awaken and to be sober. Here lies a point against enthusiasm, against the
incessant brooding of those who dwell upon and speculate about the "when"
of the παρονοια. They worry only about the "When," the "What," the objective
determination, in which they have no authentic personal interest. They remain
stuck in the worldly.
Chapter Four

The Second Letter to the Thessalonians

§ 27. Anticipation of the Parousia in the Second Letter to the Thessalonians

In his exegesis of both letters to the Thessalonians, the theologian Schmidt seeks to construct an opposition between the first and the second. According to the second letter, the παρουσία is preceded by the arrival of the Antichrist with war and turmoil; but according to the first, peace and security reign before the παρουσία, which arrives unexpectedly. According to the second letter, the Antichrist is to come as a warning and an intermediate sign. But this playing-off of different ideational [vorstellungsmaßiger] views against one another is not in the spirit of Paul. Paul is not concerned at all about answering the question of the When of the Parousia. The When is determined through the How of the self-compartment, which is determined through the enactment of factical life experience in each of its moments. Consideration of the second letter should confirm our results thus far. We will not go into the question of authenticity, nor the exegesis (cf. Hollmann in the Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft [Journal for Scholarship on the New Testament], 1901 and 1904). Only lack of understanding can disown Paul of the second letter to the Thessalonians.

Initially, we will get clear about the situation of the second letter. In what way did the first letter affect the Thessalonians? That is not so easy to see; but we can highlight some main features. The second letter presents a response to the present standpoint of the congregation. There are those in the congregation who have understood Paul, who know what is crucial. If the παρουσία depends upon how I live, then I am unable to maintain the faith and love that is demanded of me; then I approach despair. Those who think this way worry themselves in a real sense, under the sign of real concern as to whether or not they can execute the work of faith and of love, and whether or not they will hold out until the decisive day. But Paul does not help them; rather he makes their anguish still greater (II Thess. 1:5: εἰδεήνα τῆς δικαίας κρίσεως

[evidence of the righteous judgment]). Only Paul himself could have written this. The overburdened nature (plerophory) of expression in the second letter has an entirely particular motivation, and is a sign of its authenticity.

1:11: κλήρους [of his call]. Now at issue is to ask God that one will be dignified by the calling (κλήρους). Christians must be κληροί, those who are called, as opposed to those who are cast away (2:13-14: περιποίησις δόξης [obtain the glory]: the looking around for the δόξα of the Lord-concern). Paul sets those who have understood him up against those who, in more imminent expectation of the παρουσία, no longer work and loiter idly (3:11: μηδὲν ἐργαζομένους ἀλλὰ περιποιημένους [mere busybodies not doing any work]). They occupy themselves with the question (2:2), whether the Lord will come immediately. These people make an idling out of unconcern for the contingencies of life. They are concerned in a worldly manner, in all the bustling activity of talk and idling, and become a burden to the others (cf. I Thess. 4:11). Thus they have understood the first letter otherwise.

One may not read the lines from II Thess. 2:13-14 as an isolated “apocalypse.” Compare with 2:5! We are not dealing with a theoretical instruction. There, Paul reports the appearance of the people of unlawfulness, the son of ruin, of the adversary, and the like. He will come before the παρουσία (2:3: πρῶτον [first]). That is correct in terms of content. But that is not what is crucial primarily. The passage has been interpreted this way: Paul went back, became milder, no longer teaches the immediate imminence of the Parousia; he has become more careful and wants to comfort the people. Yet the entire tenor, the entire mode of expression of the second letter, speaks against this. This is not depreciation, but rather an increased tension, also in the individual expressions. The entire letter is still more urgent than the first: no taking-back, rather an enlarged tension. The Thessalonians are to be referred back to themselves. The overburdened character of the expression in Paul is to be understood first from out of this, [for] everywhere here precisely the complexes of enactment of factual life are emphasized. The following passages are characteristic of this:

II Thess 1:3 (and 2:13): εὐχαριστεῖν ὑμᾶς [we must always give thanks].
1:3: ἐπερατικά ἡ πίστις [your faith is growing]. The πίστις is not a taking-to-be true, or else the ἐπερατικά would have no meaning; the πιστεῖν is a complex of enactment that is capable of increase. This increase is the proof of genuine consciousness.
1:4: ἐν ὑμῖν ἐνκαυχόσθαι [therefore we ourselves boast] is an increase of καυχάσθαι, praise.
1:11: πᾶσαι εὐθυκίαν (decision) ἄγαθοσύνης καὶ ἔργον πίστεως [every good resolve and work of faith] (cf. εὐθυκίρησιν τῇ ἁδικίᾳ).
2:8: τῇ ἐπιφάνειᾳ τῆς παρουσίας [by the manifestation of his coming] (emphasis of what is current).
2:9: τέρασιν ψευδόν [lying wonders].
2:10: ἄσπαττον ἄδικος [wicked deception] (that is certainly a Hebraism). Everywhere the sense of enactment, here the love of truth, is emphasized through the overburdened expression.
2:10: τήν ἀγάπην τῆς ἀληθείας [to love the truth].
2:11: ἐνέργείας πλάνης [powerful delusion]. The particular vivacity. What is urgent in the situation is everywhere stressed in the πληροφορία [full conviction] of the expression.
2:13: ἐν ἀγαπημόνων πνεύματος καὶ πίστει ἀληθείας [through the sanctification by the spirit and through belief in the truth] (ἑργον πίστεως πίστεις ἀληθείας: truth stands in relational connection to faith). That shows that the πίστεις itself represents a context of enactment, which can experience an increase.
2:14: εἰς περιποίησιν δόξης [you may obtain the glory], look about in the δόξα.
3:1: ἵνα ὁ λόγος τοῦ κυρίου τρέχῃ [so that the word of the Lord may spread rapidly]: so that the proclamation runs [?]

In order to understand this “overburdened nature of the expression” (plerophory), one must imagine Paul in the urgent anguish of his vocation. The ἀπολλυμένος [those who are perishing] is missing a real enactment, which will not at all let itself be expressed positively; for the complex of enactment can be explicated neither positively as a mere course of happenings, nor negatively through some negation or other. The complex of enactment determines itself first in and with the enactment. Paul’s kind of answer occurs in the same sense as in the first letter. Again, he opposes two modes of tactical life. One does not see this if one focuses one’s view only on the content. In the so-called “apocalypse” (II Thess 2:2–13) is found precisely (2:10) what is decisive: καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀσπάτῃ ἄδικας τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις, ἀνθε' ἐν τῇ ἄγαπῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὗκ ἐδέξαντο εἰς τὸ σωτήρα αὐτούς [and every kind of wicked deception for those who are perishing, because they refused to love the truth].

The decisive position is characterized through οὗκ ἐδέξαντο. The οὗκ (“not”) is neither a non privatum nor a non negativum, but rather has the sense of the “enactmental not.” The “enactmental not” is not a refusal of enactment, not a setting-oneself-outside of the enactment. The “not” concerns the position of the complex of enactment to the relation which is motivated from out of it. The meaning of the “not” can be clarified only out of the historical context. The δέχομαι without οὗκ has no relation. It would have to have a positive emphasis, but then a “yet enact” would also be in error. Because then that which has the character of enactment would be characterized as a happening. But that which has the character of enactment is not co-possessed in the enactment itself, cannot for itself be objectified. The thoughts of negative theology grew from similar motifs of the “beyond yes and no.” In order to escape the Antichrist as Antichrist, one must have first
entered into the complex of enactment of the religious situation; for the Antichrist appears as God. The problem of negative theology appears, in a pale form, in medieval mysticism.

§ 28. The Proclamation of the Antichrist

The meaning of the proclamation of the Antichrist is the following: one must take the Antichrist for Antichrist. After all, he pretends to be a god. (Cf. II Cor. 4:4: ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος [the god of this world], after Irenæus Satan.) The facticity of knowledge is necessary for this. Whether one is a true Christian is decided by that fact that one recognizes the Antichrist. The event which should come before the παροιμία is thus, in its relational sense, one that is directed to the people (ἀπολύμενοι—κληροὶ εἰς δόξαν [those who are called into the glory]). With the arrival of the Antichrist, each must decide—even those who are unconcerned decide through this lack of concern. Already whoever remains undecided has removed himself from the complex of enactment of the anguish of expectation, and has joined the ἀπολύμενοι (cf. II Cor. 4:3).

In the exegesis, the eschatological phenomenon is considered objectively-historically. It is said that people then had believed that the end of the world had come (millenarianism). Around 120 A.D. this stops; later millenarianism returns to life repeatedly in medieval millenarianism and in modern adventism. It is said that these millenarian ideas are temporally-historically determined, and therefore have no eternal validity. One attempts to examine the eschatological ideas according to their lineage. Thereby one is led to late Judaism, further to ancient Judaism, finally to ancient Babylonian and ancient Iranian notions of the end of the world. With that one believes to have “explained” Paul, freed from all churchly ties—that is to say, to have determined how Paul himself was to have looked.

We will see that precisely this “objectivity” is, in the highest sense, constructed. For this view never puts into question whether those who have eschatological ideas of this kind indeed have them as ideas. In talk without qualification of “ideas,” one misrecognizes the fact that the eschatological is never primarily idea. The content of the idea may certainly not be eliminated, but it must be had in its own (relational) sense. The enactmental understanding from out of the situation eliminates these difficulties. It is a difficult problem for the history of culture—a problem that is very close to the concept of philosophy—to shed light upon how it so happens that the history of dogma (history of religion) has taken precisely this criticized ideational attitude. The main problem with this is not how the history of dogma entered in this ideational way, but rather why it never turned in another direction.
Origenes saw this problem in his *Commentaries on The Gospel of John* and on the individual writings of the Old Testament. Equally well did *Augustine* see this problem of the historical that lies in Christian life experience. It is a false conception to form a general concept of the historical and then impose it onto the individual formulations of problems, rather than proceeding from the respective complex of enactment (for example, from that of artistic creation or of religious experience). Likewise, the philosophical methods corrupt the sense of the history of religion. That which Paul says has a peculiar expressive function, from which one cannot tear out the "ideational content," in order, for instance, to compare it with the content of ancient Babylonian ideas. The original complex of enactment, in which the eschatological is found for Paul, is important, independently of connections that exist between Persian and Jewish eschatological ideas. The "obstinate waiting" is not some ideational "expectation," rather a δουλεύων θεο [serving God].

The obstinate waiting stands in the complex of enactment of the entire Christian life (see Schema in § 26 "The Expectation of the Parousia" p. 67). Thus the second letter to the Thessalonians is easy to understand, despite some difficulties. The situation is, in relation to the first letter, changed insofar as the words "the day of the Lord comes like a thief in the night" are understood correctly by some (calm [?] obstinate waiting) and incorrectly by others. These latter set the work aside, stand around and chat, because they expect him every day. But those who have understood him must be despairing, because the anguish increases, and each stands alone before God. It is these to whom Paul now answers that the anguish is an ένδειγμα [proof] of the calling; the others he sharply rejects. The event of the Parousia is thus directed, in its sense of happening, toward the people who bifurcate into the called and the rejected. Of the rejected ἔπολλήμενοι, the Lord of this world—that is, Satan—has blinded their sense. They cannot δοκοῦσαν [testing] (1 Thess. 5:21), that is to say, test.

§ 29. Dogma and the Complex of Enactment

It is noticeable *how little* Paul alleges [vorgibt] theoretically or dogmatically; even in the letter to the Romans. The situation is not of the sort of theoretical proof. The dogma as detached content of doctrine in an objective, epistemological emphasis could never have been guiding for Christian religiosity. On the contrary, the genesis of dogma can only be understood from out of the enactment of Christian life experience. The allegedly dogmatic doctrinal content of the letter to the Romans is, also, only understandable out of the en-

3. [Cf. the lecture "Augustine and Neo-Platonism" in this volume.]
actment in which Paul stands, in which he writes to the Romans. His procedure of proof is nowhere a purely theoretical complex of reasons, but is rather always an original complex of becoming of the kind that, in the end, is also merely shown in a proof. What reigns here is the opposition of basic comportments of practical life: σωκόμενοι and ἀπολλύμενοι, which does not mean “the rejected ones,” but rather “to be in the state of becoming rejected,” etc. The participium praesentis instead of participium perfecti emphasizes the enactment that is still in process. At issue is an acceptance, which is a final deciding.

The ὁδὸς δέχεσθαι has a positive sense, in disabling knowledge. This δέχεσθαι thus grounds the ἐπίδεικνυμεν [to know] and δοκιμάζειν [testing]. Paul sees these two types of people under the pressure of his calling as the proclaimer. The δέχεσθαι ἀγάπην (love as enactment) ἀληθίαν [truth] means a complex of enactment, which enables for the δοκιμάζειν of the divine. On the basis of this δοκιμάζειν, the knower first sees the great danger in store for the religious person: whoever does not accept the enactment cannot at all see the Antichrist who appears in the semblance of the divine (ἀντικείμενος ἐπὶ πάντα λεγόμενον θεόν [he opposes above every so-called god]), and becomes enslaved to him without even noticing it. The danger becomes apparent only to the believers; the appearance of the Antichrist is directed precisely toward the believers, the appearance is a “test” for those who know. The ἀπολλύμενοι believe (2:11) the ψεύδος [delusion], they are deceived precisely in their highest bustling activity with the “sensation” of the Parousia, and fall from their original concern for the divine. For this reason, they will be absolutely annihilated—Paul knows no mere afterlife [Postexistenz] for the damned away from God—and they lose ἐνόη [life]. The appearance of the Antichrist in godly robes facilitates the falling-tendency of life; in order not to fall prey to it, one must stand ever ready for it.

The appearance of the Antichrist is no mere passing occurrence, but rather something upon which each one’s fate is decided—even that of the already-believing. As ἀντικείμενος who opposes himself to the divine, he is the enemy of the believer, although he makes his appearance in the form of the divine itself. The revelation (ἀποκάλυψις) is only a revelation for one who possesses the possibility of distinguishing. Thus the warning (II Thess. 2:3) that they should not let themselves be deceived. 2:11: The rejected believe the lie; they are not indifferent; they are highly busy, but they are deceived and fall prey to the Antichrist. Thus, they do not neglect what is Christian as irrelevant, but rather show a peculiar increase, which fulfills their blindness and completes the fall [Abfall] to the anti-godly, so that a return is impossible. In Paul, to be damned means an absolute annihilation, absolute nothingness; there are no levels of hell, as in later dogma. The recoiling and increasing reformulation
of Christian life experience into objective form was effected through the apologetic reaction of defense against paganism and its science.

The πρῶτον ἔλοθη [comes first] (2:3) does not mean extension of the deadline, rather precisely, in the sense of Christian facticity, an increase of the highest anguish. Thus Paul concludes in 2:15, with a summary of his eschatological account: Ἄρα οὖν, ἀδελφοί, στήκετε καὶ κρατεῖτε τὰς παραδόσεις (tradition?) ἕως ἐνι τῆς ἁγίασθαι ὑμῶν [so then, brothers and sisters, stand firm and hold fast to the traditions that you were taught by us either by word of mouth or by our letter]. To the Christian, only his τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐνακτίεσθαι ἐν ὑμῖν of the complex of enactment in which he really stands is to be decisive, but not the anticipation of a special event that is futurably situated in temporality. In late-Judaism, the anticipation of the Messiah refers primarily to such a futural event, to the appearance of the Messiah at which other people will be present. Ezra IV shows already acquaintance with the Christian prevalence of enactment, as opposed to the event-complex that is expected. From this complex of enactment with God arises something like temporality to begin with. I Thess. 2:6–7: καὶ νῦν τὸ κατέχειν [and you know what is now restraining him] (that, which holds back the Antichrist) οἴδατε.—τὸ γὰρ μυστήριον ἣν ἐνεργεῖται τῆς ἀνομίας [for the mystery of lawlessness is already at work].

Theodoret, Augustine, and others see in κατέχειν the precipitous order of the Roman Empire, which suppresses persecution of Christians by Jews. This passage could be regarded as an objection to our argumentation. Paul would be here concerned with the objective. But: the secret of sin (μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας) is already at work; that is what is decisive. Sin is just as much a mystery as faith. μόνον δὲ κατέχειν ἀργὺς ἐκ μέσου γένηται [but only until the one who now restrains it is removed]. The verses 6–7 encompass the problem of the Christian attitude toward a non-Christian surrounding world and communal world, and thus the problem of salvation history. From this context I Thess. 4:13 can be understood: οἱ λοιποὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες ἑλλάδα [as others do who have no hope] (ἕπομονὴν ἐλλάδα). That is to say, all who stand outside the Christian context of becoming are without guidance as to the question of the dead. The way in which God resurrected Christ, so too will he bring the dead to him along with Christ. “That we believe.” (πιστεύομεν).

But we do not have to concern ourselves with such curious questions, for faith gives us certainty. Mark 9:1: Individuals among you will not die, before the βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ [the kingdom of God] comes ἐν δύναμι [has come to power].

Paul, too, still expected the Parousia before his death. The great presentation [Aufmachung] in which the Antichrist appears facilitates faith for the believers,

4. [Bishop of Kyrrhos in Northern Syria, 393–ca. 466 A.D.]
if they already are decided. The decision itself is very difficult. The expectation must already be such that through faith, the deception of the Antichrist will be recognized as deception. The "before" is thus here increase of the highest anguish. That is why (2:15) Paul says only: stand firm and master the traditions that you have experienced. The questions of content may not be understood detachedly. The opposition of dogmatism and morality is actually misguided, too. The title "eschatology" is just as oblique, because it is taken out of Christian dogma and designates the doctrine of final things. Here we do not understand it in this theoretical-disciplinary sense.
Chapter Five

Characteristics of Early Christian Life Experience

§ 30. Factual Life Experience and Proclamation

On the object of proclamation: we must differentiate between the proclamation of the synoptics and that of Paul. In the synoptic gospels, Jesus announces the *kingdom of God*, ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ (Luke 16:16). In Pauline gospel, the proper *object of the proclamation is already Jesus himself as Messiah*. Cf. I Cor. 15:1–11. Here the essential teachings of Paul are found, but they are and remain entwined with the *How*, with life; they are not concerned with a specifically theoretical teaching. Cf. Rom. 1:3, Rom. 10:9: the resurrection and the faith in the son of God as Lord is the basic condition of salvation. The concept of the gospel as we know it today arises first from Justin and Irenaeus and is entirely different from the Pauline concept (character of enactment). The first sentence of the gospel of Mark still has the original sense. (Beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, ἄρχῃ τοῦ εὐαγγέλιου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, whereby Jesus Christ is to be understood as gen. obj.)

The factual life experience of the Christians is historically determined insofar as it always begins with the proclamation. The connection of the Christian with the surrounding world is discussed in I Cor. 1:26–27; 7:20. The significances of life remain, but a new comportment arises. We want to follow further the problem of proclamation in such a way that we leave matters of content entirely aside; now it must be shown that Christian religiosity lives temporality. What meaning communal-worldly and surrounding-worldly relations have for the Christian must be understood; and if they do, in what way. Christian factual life experience is historically determined by its emergence with the proclamation that hits the people in a moment, and then is unceasingly also alive in the enactment of life. Further, this life experience determines, for its part, the relations which are found in it.

For all its originality, primordial Christian facticity gains no exceptionality, absolutely no special quality at all. In all its absoluteness of reorganizing the enactment, everything remains the same in respect to the worldly facticity. The accentuation of the Christian life has the manner of enactment: I Thess. 3:3; 5:9. All primary complexes of enactment lead together toward God, are enacted before God. At the same time, the ἀναμένων [waiting] is an obstinate waiting before God. The obstinate waiting does not wait for the significances of a future content, but for God. The meaning of temporality determines itself
out of the fundamental relationship to God—however, in such a way that only those who live temporality in the manner of enactment understand eternity. The sense of the Being of God can be determined first only out of these complexes of enactment. To pass through them is the precondition. Further, it must be asked how dogmatic conceptuality arises out of such complexes of enactment. It is essential that the proclamation always remains co-present as alive, not only as a thankful memory.

In this having-become, how should the Christian comport himself to the surrounding world and communal world (I Cor. 7:20; 1:26 ff. σοφοὶ, δυνατοὶ, εὐγενεῖς [wise, powerful, of noble birth])?—Tὰ δὲν ὑπάρχοντα: the reality of worldly life is targeted. The reality of life consists in the appropriative tendency of such significances. But these do not at all become dominating tendencies in the realm of the facticity of Christian life. Rather ἐν τῇ κλήσει μενέτω [remain in the condition in which you were called]! At issue is only to find a new fundamental comportment to it. That must be shown now in the manner of its enactment-structure. The indeed existing [daselsten] significances of real life are lived ὡς μῆ, as if not.

§ 31. The Relational Sense of Primordial Christian Religiosity

The relational sense of primordial Christian religiosity to the surrounding world, communal world, and self-world is to be determined; the authentic self is still to be differentiated from the self-world. Precisely the relations of the self-world are hit the hardest: self-worldly concern carries the semblance within itself. Paul is clear about the fact that these relational directions demand a peculiar characterization, which he renders in apparently common terms: πνεῦμα, ψυχή, σῶμα [spirit, soul, flesh]. Precisely these concepts typically illustrate that a wrong direction of understanding is entirely unable to hit upon the genuine meaning. One grasps them as qualities and thingily [dingliche] determinates. Only the correct explication of the sense-complexes allows a religious-historical comparison. Before this, all such compilation of material is not useful even for a modicum of understanding.

The explication must be maintained on its first level. There are subjective limitations of understanding: κανή κτίσις [a new creation], Gal. 6:15 (κλήσις, call). I Cor. 7:20 stands out. One should remain in the calling in which one is. The γενέσθαι is a μένειν [remaining]. In all the radical reorganization, something remains. In what sense is the remaining to be understood? Will it itself be taken into becoming, indeed in such a way that the sense of remaining is, in its What and How, first determined out of having-become? With this, a peculiar complex of sense is indicated: these relations to the surrounding world receive their sense not out of the formal significance they indicate;
rather the reverse, the relation and the sense of lived significance are determined out of the original enactment. Put schematically: something remains unchanged, and yet it is radically changed. Here we have a playground of clever paradoxes, but that does not help us! Pointed formulations explain nothing.

The relational sense is not changed, and still less the content. Thus: the Christian does not step out of this world. If one is called as slave, he should not at all fall into the tendency [to suppose] that something could be won for his Being in the increase of his freedom. The slave should remain a slave. It is a matter of indifference in which surrounding-worldly significance he stands. The slave as Christian is free from all bonds, but the free one as Christian becomes a slave before God. (The γενέσθαι is a δουλεύειν before God.) These directions of sense which refer to the surrounding world, to one’s vocation, and to that which one is (self-world) determine in no way the facticity of the Christian. Nonetheless they are there, they will be maintained and first authentically assigned [zugueignet] there. The significances of the surrounding world become, through having-been, temporal possessions. The sense of facticity determines itself in this direction as temporality. Until now, the relational sense of the surrounding world and communal world was purely negatively determined. Insofar as these relations have no possibility at all to motivate the arch-ontic meaning of primordial Christian religiosity, the positive question arises regarding the relation of the Christian to the surrounding world and the communal world.

Now for the relational sense in which the Christian stands to the surrounding world. These are difficult connections, because the relations to the self-world are precisely hit the hardest through the Christian having-become. In Paul himself these connections are only briefly, yet sharply, touched upon (Cor. and Phil.). Paul is clear about the fact that this relational direction requires a unique characterization (πνεῦμα—spirit, ψυχή—soul, σάρξ—flesh). Usually, these concepts are grasped as conditions [als zuständliche]. The surrounding-worldly and communal-worldly connections co-constitute facticity; but they are temporal possessions, insofar as they are lived in temporality.

1 Cor. 7:29–32: We know the γενέσθαι as δουλεύειν and ἀναμένειν. Here: καρος συνεταλμένος [the appointed time has grown short]. There remains only yet a little time, the Christian living incessantly in the only-yet, which intensifies his distress. The compressed temporality is constitutive for Christian religiosity: an “only-yet,” there is no time for postponement. The Christians should be such that those who have a wife, should have her in such a way, that they do not have her, etc. Το χήμα τού κόσμου [the present form of this world]: the form of the world passes away; χήμα is not meant so very objectively, rather as ordered toward a self-comportment. Rom. 12:2 shows how χήμα [form] should be understood: καὶ μὴ συνεχηματίζεσθε το ὀλόν τούτο
[and do not be conformed to this world]. Here one can gather the enactment-character of σύμμαχος. The connections Paul [makes] should not be ethically understood. That is why it is a misperception when Nietzsche accuses Paul of *resentment*. *Ressentiment* in no way belongs to this realm; in this context one cannot speak at all of *resentment*. If one enters into that kind of talk, one shows only that one has understood nothing.

One is tempted to translate the ὅς μή by “as if,” but that will not work. “As if” expresses an objective connection, and suggests the view that the Christian should eliminate these relations to the surrounding world. This ὅς means, positively, a new sense that is added. The μή concerns the complex of enactment of the Christian life. All of these relations experience a retardation in the respective enactment, so that they arise out of the origin of primordial Christian life experience. Christian life is not straightforward, but is rather broken up: all surrounding-world relations must pass through the complex of enactment of having-become, so that this complex is then co-present, but the relations themselves, and that to which they refer, are in no way touched. Who can grasp it, should grasp it. The isolation of Christian life sounds negative. Properly understood, the complex of experience can be grasped only out of the origin of Christian life-context. In Christian life there is, however, also an unbroken life-context, on the level of spirituality [Geistigkeit]—which has nothing to do with the harmony of life. With brokenness, the anguish and the gloominess of the Christians is still intensified; it has entered into the innermost realm. The aforementioned passage can apparently be easily interpreted, and yet a genuine understanding renders it ever more difficult. The Christian life should, on the side of the surrounding world, receive a character of self-evidence (I Cor. 4:11–13).

§ 32. Christian Facticity as Enactment

Christian life experience is not modified by having-become itself. The relational sense of Christian life experience is different from that of the surrounding-worldly. If the surrounding-worldly relational sense were independent of Christian life experience, then certain passages in Paul would be incomprehensible. The conversion to Christian life experience concerns the enactment. In order to raise the relational sense of factual life experience, one must be careful that it becomes more “difficult,” that it is enacted ἐν ἔν αἰχμαλωσίας. The phenomena of enactment must be entwined with the sense of facticity. Paul makes of enactment a theme. It reads: ὅς μή, not ὅν. This μή indicates the tendency toward that which has the character of enactment. μή refers back to the enactment itself.

Articulating the phenomena gives rise to the necessity of setting aside any psychological schema. One must allow the phenomena to present themselves
in their originality. Nothing is accomplished yet in merely “bringing to giv-
erness”; this succeeds only through phenomenological destruction. Cf. I Cor.
4:11: Paul says: “Become my descendants!” He gives up all worldly means
and significances and yet fights his way through. Through the renunciation of
the worldly manner of defending oneself the anguish of his life is intensified.
Entering into such complex of enactment is almost hopeless. The Christian is
conscious that this facticity cannot be won out of his own strength, but rather
originates from God—the phenomenon of the effects of grace. An explication
of these complexes is very important. The phenomenon is decisive for Au-
gustine and Luther, cf. II Cor. 4:7 f.: τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἡμῶν [to God and
does not come from us], then the oppositions; θαυμάζειν, ὁλιγ' οὖν etc. “We
have the treasure (of Christian facticity) in earthen vessels.” What is available
only to us Christians is not sufficient for the task of arriving at Christian
facticity.

Without Christian facticity, the significances of life would be decisive and
would modify the relational complex. But here the course of the sense of
factual life runs opposite. The enactment exceeds human strength. It is un-
thinkable out of one’s own strength. Factual life, from out of its own re-
sources, cannot provide the motives to attain even the γενέωθα. Through the
over-intensification of a significance, life attempts to “gain a foothold.” This
concept of a “foothold” is meaningful in an entirely particular structure of
factual life experience. One cannot apply it to Christian factual life experi-
ence. The Christian does not find in God a “foothold” (cf. Jaspers'). That is
blasphemy! God is never a “foothold.” Rather, “to have a foothold” is always
accomplished in view of a particular significance, attitude, view of the world,
insofar as God is, in giving a foothold and in winning a foothold, correlative
to a significance. Christian worldview: actually a contradiction! It does not
arise from a complex of a historical kind, like the Christian. Thus whoever
has not “accepted” (δέχεοθα) is unable to sustain facticity or to appropriate
the “knowledge.” Cf. I Cor. 3:21 f.; Phil. 2:12 f. In Christian life experience,
it arises from the sense of the surrounding world, that the world does not just
happen to be there. It is no ἀδιάφορον [indifferent]. The significance of
the world—also that of one’s own world—is given and experienced in a peculiar
way through the retrieval of the relational complexes in the authentic enact-
ment.

§ 33. The Complex of Enactment as “Knowledge”

The χράεωθα κόσμως [to deal with the world], the μὴ συγχρηματίζειν [do not
have dealings] requires a particular mode of deciding: δοκιμάζειν [testing].

im Unendlichen.
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eidéma [to know]. As long as one begins from contemporary psychology and epistemology, stipulating phenomena of consciousness, one arrives at a false understanding of “knowledge.” Characterizing it as “practical knowledge” brings one no closer to its sense-structure. One cannot simply presuppose, as understood, “knowledge per se” and then adapt it. The question as to which basic complex “knowledge” refers back, is thus answered: in that of the doulénein [serving] and anaménein [waiting]. Knowledge does not run alongside and freely in abeyance, but is rather always present. The complexes of enactment themselves, according to their own sense, are a “knowledge.” Cf. I Cor. 2:10: ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεκάλυψεν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ γὰρ πνεῦμα πάντα ἑρανύχ, καὶ τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ [these things God has revealed to us through the spirit; for the spirit searches everything, even the depth of God] etc.

According to its own essence, “knowledge” requires πνεῦμα ἔχειν. In modern exegesis, the meanings of the word πνεῦμα have been researched in the contemporaneous and in the ancient literature further back, all the way back to Plato. One sees analogies to this especially in certain passages of the “Hermes Trismegistos” (in the so-called “Corpus Hermeticum”). These lines coincide linguistically-stylistically and chronologically with Paul. It is said that, in the above-cited passage (I Cor. 2:10 ff.), Paul characterizes himself as a “pneumatic.” The human being becomes God himself. Ἀνήπ πνευματικὸς [human spirit] is said to be the godly, Ἀνήπ ψυχικὸς [human soul] the human, in him. This passage serves as argument for a connection of the Pauline writings to the Hellenistic mystery-religions. But this is misguided. Object-historically, no objection can be made, but from the enactment-historical interpretation, πνεῦμα, ἀνακρίνειν, ἑρανύχ, τὰ βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ [the spirit, searching, things, the depth of God] (I Cor. 2:10) mean something entirely different.

The πνεῦμα in Paul is the basis of enactment from which knowledge itself arises. πνεῦμα is in Paul connected with ἀνακρίνειν and ἑρανύχ (I Cor. 2:15; cf. also II Cor. 4:16, the “external” and “inner” human being; Rom. 8:4 ff. πνεῦμα-ἀφην). Ἀφην is a φρόνημα (8:6), a conviction; that is to say, a tendency of life. Gal. 2:20; Phil. 1:22: ἀφην is the complex of enactment of authentic facticity in surrounding-worldly life. Its opposite πνεῦμα is thus the doulénein and ἀνακρίνειν. There is in Paul no πνεῦμα ἔχειν [being spirit] (as in Corpus Hermeticum), but rather a πνεῦμα ἔχειν, ἐν πνευμάτι περιπατεῖν [having spirit, living in spirit], or ἐπιτελεύται [being subject to]. Thus it is false to view πνεῦμα as a part of the human being; rather ἀνθρωπος πνευματικὸς is one who has appropriated a certain peculiar property of life. That means the πάντα ἀνακρίνειν. In sharp opposition to this is the theoretical cognition, the πάντα γνώριζειν in the hermetic writings, cf. II Cor. 3:3. There remains a deep op-

position between the Mystics and the Christians. The Mystic is, through manipulation, removed from the life-complex; in an enraptured state God and the universe are possessed. The Christian knows no such “enthusiasm,” rather he says: “let us be awake and sober.” Here precisely is shown to him the terrible difficulty of the Christian life.

Real philosophy of religion arises not from preconceived concepts of philosophy and religion. Rather, the possibility of its philosophical understanding arises out of a certain religiosity—for us, the Christian religiosity. Why exactly the Christian religiosity lies in the focus of our study, that is a difficult question; it is answerable only through the solution of the problem of the historical connections. The task is to gain a real and original relationship to history, which is to be explicated from out of our own historical situation and facticity. At issue is what the sense of history can signify for us, so that the “objectivity” of the historical “in itself” disappears. History exists only from out of a present. Only thus can the possibility of a philosophy of religion be begun.